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THE TWO TRENDS THAT MATTER FOR 
PARTY POLITICS 
JOSEPH FISHKIN† & HEATHER K. GERKEN‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
We are working on a project that begins with two simple 
observations about the current state of party politics. The first is that 
the political arena is now dominated by what one of us has called 
“shadow parties”1—nominally independent groups that are run by 
major party insiders and that perform functions that in the past were 
performed directly by the parties. We’re talking about groups like 
Organizing For Action (OFA), once run by Jim Messina, or the 
American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS groups run by Karl Rove. 
These groups are doing a lot more than buying a few independent 
ads. They’re also doing voter mobilization, maintaining 
comprehensive partisan voter databases, employing long-term 
campaign workers, testing messages, and strategizing about the 
party’s pitch and message in individual campaigns and across multiple 
races.2 
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Brennan Center Convening, Money in Politics 2030: Toward a New Jurisprudence. A 
proper thank you to our research assistants will appear in a forthcoming piece in the 
Supreme Court Review. 
 1  Heather K. Gerken, Boden Lecture: The Real Problem with Citizens United: 
Campaign Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903 (2014), 
available at http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol97/iss4/3. The first section draws 
heavily from that piece. 
 2  See, e.g., Joe Arnold, American Crossroads Spending Big in Kentucky, WHAS11 
POLITICAL BLOG (Aug. 27, 2010, 11:21 AM), 
http://www.whas11.com/community/blogs/political-blog/American-Crossroads-spending-
big-in-Kentucky—101652653.html (describing American Crossroads’s get-out-the-vote 
efforts in a Senate race); Edward-Isaac Dovere, OFA Embraces Tea Party Blueprint for 
August Push, POLITICO (July 23, 2010, 5:10 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/ofa-embraces-tea-party-blueprint-for-august-push-
94601_Page2.html (describing OFA’s volunteer recruitment and employment of long-term 
campaign staff); Derrick Harris, Obama Seeks Data Scientists for Election Edge, 
GIGAOM.COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 3:08 PM), https://gigaom.com/2011/09/19/obama-seeks-
data-scientists-for-election-edge (describing OFA’s data acquisition and analytics); Nick 
Judd, Obama’s Targeted GOTV on Facebook Reached 5 Million Voters, Goff Says, 
TECHPRESIDENT (Nov. 30, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/23202/obamas-targeted-
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The second trend is the flip side of the first. As these nominally 
independent groups have been on the rise, the formal parties have 
been waning. As institutions—especially on the Republican side—the 
formal parties are now quite weak. 
To call the parties weak at this particular moment in American 
political time may seem odd, even counterintuitive. In some ways the 
parties are stronger now than in living memory. Congress today is 
extremely polarized along partisan lines. The divide between the 
parties in terms of both ideology and voting patterns is deeper and 
clearer than it has been for at least sixty years.3 Being a Democrat or 
a Republican really means something today—to a degree that it did 
not during the entire postwar era, when liberal northeastern 
Republicans and conservative southern Democrats stretched the 
fabric of each party’s big tent. Now, the tents are smaller and there’s a 
lot more space between them. 
Like their representatives in Congress, voters have also sorted 
themselves more coherently by ideology, with almost all the liberals 
voting Democratic and almost all the conservatives voting 
Republican.4 With moderates in both parties rare and with the 
 
gotv-facebook-reached-5-million-voters-goff-says  (describing OFA’s voter mobilization 
efforts); Jeremy W. Peters, Subtler Entry from Masters of Attack Ads, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/politics/new-crossroads-gps-ad-takes-a-
soft-shot-at-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (describing American Crossroads’s ad 
testing and message development); Ken Thomas, A Permanent Campaign? President 
Obama Will Turn His Re-election Organization into a Group to Back His Agenda, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:25 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obama-wages-permanent-campaign-article-
1.1242364 (describing OFA’s permanent staff and campaign infrastructure); Peter 
Wallsten & Tom Hamburger, Conservative Groups Reaching New Levels of Sophistication 
in Mobilizing Voters, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/conservative-groups-reaching-new-
levels-of-sophistication-in-mobilizing-voters/2012/09/20/3c3cd8e8-026c-11e2-91e7-
2962c74e7738_story.html  (describing get-out-the-vote efforts by conservative outside 
groups in the 2012 election). 
 3  For instance, for the first time since political scientists began tracking this data, the 
most moderate Republican is now considerably more conservative than the most 
moderate Democrat. For important work on polarization trends, see generally KEITH T. 
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & CONGRESS (2d rev. ed. 2007); SEAN M. 
THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); POLITICS TO THE EXTREME: 
AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Scott A. Frisch 
& Sean Q Kelly eds., 2013);  Christopher Hare, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, Howard 
Rosenthal, Polarization Is Real (and Asymmetric), MONKEY CAGE (May 15, 2012), 
http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/15/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric. For a 
thoughtful analysis of this trend’s relationship to political regulations and election law, see 
also Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011). 
 4  For an account of this trend, see generally MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE 
PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME 
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Republican Party moving dramatically to the right, the differences 
between Democrats and Republicans are starker and clearer for 
voters than they have been for several generations.5 Much has been 
made of the rise of “unaffiliated” voters, who officially refuse to call 
themselves Democrats or Republicans.6 But in reality, however, most 
of these voters are strongly attached to one party or the other; they 
just don’t say so when initially asked about their party affiliation.7 
Despite the strong ideological ties between voters and their 
parties, party organizations are becoming weaker. As John Boehner’s 
near-constant travails with the House Republicans have shown, party 
leaders are less able to maintain coalitions within their own parties or 
build them with their counterparts on the other side of the aisle. And 
all the while, the shadow parties are becoming stronger. These 
observations lead to interesting questions for policymakers and courts 
alike about the shape party politics will take in the future. In a 
forthcoming article in the Supreme Court Review,8 we will explore 
some of those questions in greater depth. Here, we’ll just note some 
of the questions that interest us without providing anything akin to a 
definitive answer. All three questions center on the relationship 
between the “shadow parties” and the formal parties: (1) How are the 
shadow parties changing party politics? (2) Will McCutcheon reverse 
this trend? (3) If not, why should we care? 
 
REPUBLICANS (2009).  
 5  These polarizing changes took place on both sides, but they were asymmetric in 
magnitude: By almost every measure, Republicans moved further right than Democrats 
moved left. See Norm Ornstein, Yes, Polarization Is Asymmetric—and Conservatives Are 
Worse, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2014, 10:17 AM), 
http://m.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/yes-polarization-is-asymmetric-and-
conservatives-are-worse/373044.  
 6  The numbers of such voters, in opinion surveys, have indeed risen rapidly. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-High 42% of Americans Identify as Independents, GALLUP POL. 
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166763/record-high-americans-identify-
independents.aspx (“[T]he general trend in recent years, including the 2012 election year, 
has been toward greater percentages of Americans identifying with neither the 
Republican nor the Democratic Party, although most still admit to leaning toward one of 
the parties.”). 
 7  This is not a new point, but its salience only increases as the number of independent 
voters continues to rise. See, e.g., BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE 
INDEPENDENT VOTER 23–24 (1992) (explaining that the vast majority of nominally 
independent voters in fact lean strongly one way or the other—and vote that way).  
 8  For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. 
Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party 
System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2015). 
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I 
HOW ARE SHADOW PARTIES CHANGING PARTY POLITICS? 
If you are going to talk about party politics, you first have to start 
with the question that law professors, with their penchant for 
categorization, would ask: What’s a political party? The question isn’t 
nearly as silly as it sounds, and it has deep and pragmatic implications 
for our project. Shadow parties are obviously separate from the 
formal, legal party apparatus. But we think any definition of “the 
party” that excludes groups run by consummate party insiders like 
Jim Messina and Karl Rove—groups that perform many of the same 
functions as the traditional parties—is formalistic to the point of 
being inaccurate. 
So what is a party? Borrowing from law professors like Michael 
Kang and political scientists like Seth Masket, we think of the parties 
as complex ecosystems, with different power centers and nodes of 
influence and multiple points of entry.9 The formal party organization 
is part of it, but so are independent entities—not just shadow parties, 
but the National Rifle Association, teachers’ unions, and the Heritage 
Foundation.10 Officeholders are also part of this ecosystem, and so are 
donors and activists. They all constitute what we term the party writ 
large. They have enough interests in common to play for the same 
team, but on many issues their views or interests diverge, and they 
pull the party in different directions. 
In our view, then, the emergence of these major independent 
groups is important to the party writ large. We don’t think of the 
independent groups as shifting power “away” from the party, but as 
shifting power within the party. Shadow parties are shifting power 
away from the formal party structure, to be sure. But they are still 
part of the party writ large. What’s shifting is the center of gravity 
within the parties. 
Shifts like this happen semi-regularly. Sometimes they’re the 
result of changes internal to the party, and sometimes they’re the 
result of external shocks (such as new campaign-finance regulations). 
Sam Issacharoff’s astute piece in this symposium offers a great 
example, as he describes how the soft-money regime empowered the 
 
 9  See generally Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 131 (2005); Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, 
Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012). 
 10  This is why work like Michael Malbin’s is so important for tracing the complexities 
of the current funding environment. See Michael J. Malbin, McCutcheon Could Lead to 
No Limits for Political Parties – With What Implications for Parties and Interest Groups?, 
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 92 (2014).  
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state parties.11 Or think of the Democrats after the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission reforms.12 The goal of these reforms was to shift the 
balance of power over the presidential nominating process, moving it 
away from the party bosses in smoke-filled rooms and toward the 
party membership. To some extent, the reforms did just that. The 
presidential primary process that emerged from the reforms is one in 
which, as the Democrats saw in 2008, the party membership can exert 
a lot of influence, even overriding some of the other nodes of power 
within the party, such as elected officials.13 But the ecosystem is more 
complicated than 2008 suggests. While the current nominating system 
gives party activists more sway than the old one, the party elites 
nonetheless continue to exert a great deal of power through what 
some call the “invisible primary,” which takes place before a single 
vote is cast.14 
A different example, one that’s even more pertinent to the story 
we’re telling today, comes from Wisconsin during the first half of the 
twentieth century.15 Wisconsin imposed some powerful limits on 
political parties—limiting their ability to electioneer, raise money, etc. 
How did the party elites respond? They abandoned the official party 
structure and joined private “statewide voluntary committees” that 
supported the party. That’s how they did all the electioneering and 
fundraising they needed to do—as private associations. 
We can see the same phenomenon happening now, with 
 
 11  Samuel Issacharoff, Market Intermediaries in the Post-Buckley World, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 105 (2014).  
 12  For an overview of the development of the primary process, see, for example, 
LARRY M. BARTELS, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC 
CHOICE (1988); NELSON W. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 3–40 (1983).  
 13  As the “superdelegate” controversy made clear, much of the party leadership was 
initially behind Senator Clinton. But the results of the caucuses and primaries eventually 
pushed the entire party to endorse Senator Obama for the presidency. 
 14  See, e.g., MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES: PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER REFORM 9–16 (2008) (explaining how party elites 
reasserted control over the presidential nominating process as the long run-up to the 
primaries became a test of fundraising and elite support that winnows the field and in 
almost all cases predicts the ultimate presidential nominees); see also Kang, supra note 9, 
at 151–55 (providing an overview of the political science literature on the invisible 
primary). 
 15  The classic account is Frank J. Sorauf, Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin, 48 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 692 (1954) (describing the rise of private political organizations in 
Wisconsin during the twentieth century); see also LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICS IN 
WISCONSIN 28–29 (1958); Steven E. Schier, New Rules, New Games: National Party 
Guidelines and Democratic National Convention Delegate Selection in Iowa and Wisconsin, 
1968–1976, 10 PUBLIUS 101, 104–05 (1980) (same).  For a similar take on this history, see 
SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS 
CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES 44 (2011); Kang, supra note 9, 
at 147. 
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SuperPACs and nonprofits subbing in for Wisconsin’s statewide 
voluntary committees.16 Many thought that independent spending 
organizations would be, well, independent—funded by wealthy donors 
who were interested in pursuing their own agenda, not the party’s or 
the candidate’s. But that’s not what happened. Political candidates, it 
turns out, can have their cake and eat it, too. They can take advantage 
of all of the perks associated with the formal party structure while 
benefitting from the unlimited fundraising capacity of independent 
organizations. Just take a look at the 2012 presidential election. Every 
serious candidate had a SuperPAC, and their SuperPACs were 
awfully cozy with the campaigns despite the prohibition on 
coordination. You had companies working for both Romney’s 
campaign and his SuperPAC sharing the same office in Alexandria, 
for example, with the founder of one of the companies married to a 
deputy campaign manager for the campaign. The deputy campaign 
manager, as it happened, also ran a consulting firm out of the same 
office suite.17 But don’t worry—they said they never shared 
information! 
The suite in Alexandria is but a stand-in for the bigger story 
about shadow parties. It’s not just that the shadow parties are being 
run by former campaign staff or people close to the candidate. It’s not 
just that high-level campaign operatives and even the candidates 
themselves are showing up at SuperPAC fundraisers and generally 
treating them more or less like arms of the campaign. As an 
important new study out of Ohio State’s Moritz College of Law 
shows, the campaigns have also found both private and public means 
of cooperating with independent groups without violating formal 
legal bans on “coordination.”18 
Networks are the reason that candidates and outside donors can 
cooperate behind the scenes. Political elites are highly networked and 
sophisticated enough to play the coordination game carefully. As the 
Moritz study explained, members of the campaign leadership “hear 
things” even though no one from an outside group ever speaks to 
them directly.19 One insider explained that messages are passed 
 
 16  Gerken, supra note 1, at 915. 
 17  Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between ‘Super PACs’ and Campaigns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/us/politics/loose-border-
of-super-pac-and-romney-campaign.html.  
 18  DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E.B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE 
SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 2 (2014); see also Heather Gerken, The 
Political Thriller Published by the Moritz College of Law, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 18, 
2014, 6:07 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=62416 (reviewing TOKAJI & STRAUSE, 
supra). 
 19  TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 18, at 65. 
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through “a friend of a friend of a friend of a friend.”20 
Political operatives use public as well as private channels to 
communicate with one another. One of the deep ironies of the Moritz 
findings is that the mechanisms long intended to make politics 
“transparent” are being hijacked to serve nontransparent ends. Any 
campaign head worth his salt becomes what the Moritz study calls 
“the conductor”21 who signals the campaign’s messaging strategies in 
surprisingly public ways. Campaigns issue press releases that they 
know the media won’t pick up—but independent groups will. 
Campaigns manipulate journalists to send “smoke signals” to outside 
groups. The high–resolution photos and clips known as “b-roll” 
footage are often embedded into the website in case an outside group 
needs good visuals. Campaigns circulate donor lists in advance of 
FEC disclosure deadlines to help outside groups identify potential 
donors. Outside groups similarly use public channels to convey 
hidden messages. Voter alerts and scorecards were intended to help 
public-interest groups track votes. Now they are used to pressure 
politicians. If a powerful interest group is tracking this or that vote, 
politicians pay attention as well. Campaigns also keep a close eye on 
the spending patterns of outside groups and sometimes hire the same 
media vendors.22 
As a result of these transparent and nontransparent coordinating 
devices, the campaigns and the shadow parties are coordinating 
without “coordinating.” Far from being independent, they are 
working in tandem to advance candidates and issues. Shadow parties, 
in short, are doing much of the work of the formal parties nowadays. 
You might think that this doesn’t make any real difference. On 
this view, the shadow parties are just part of a campaign-finance shell 
game—yet another example of what Pam Karlan and Sam Issacharoff 
have called the “hydraulics of campaign finance.”23 Money is flowing 
through one outlet rather than another, but it’s the same money and 
it doesn’t make a lot of difference which legal entities it passes 
through in the end. 
We think there’s more to this story, however. Sometimes it 
matters if money flows through one outlet rather than another. If 
money moves primarily through the shadow parties rather than the 
formal parties, this can affect the balance of power inside the party 
 
 20  Id. at 66–67. 
 21  Id. at 66. The facts in this paragraph and the next are all drawn from the Moritz 
study. 
 22  Id. at 64–69. 
 23  Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999). 
FISHKIN-GERKEN-FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/14/2014  6:55 PM 
2014] THE TWO TRENDS THAT MATTER 39 
 
writ large. Our tentative view is that the shift toward shadow parties 
affects the balance of power within the party in a significant way. 
That’s because, as we discuss below, the formal parties have more 
points of entry than the shadow parties. While we do not want to 
romanticize the formal parties, we do think it is worth recognizing 
that they are subject to influence by a more varied set of actors, in a 
way that promotes pluralism within the parties. 
The shadow parties are structured differently. They are closed to 
most and controlled by few. As we note below, we are especially 
concerned about the possibility that the structural shift from formal 
parties to shadow parties will shift the balance of power away from 
the party faithful (whose means of influencing the party is 
volunteering on campaigns, participating in caucuses and 
conventions, and so on) and toward the entities within the party with 
the most money, whose means of influencing the party writ large is to 
contribute or spend. 
II 
WILL MCCUTCHEON REVERSE THE TREND? 
You might think that these worries are beside the point now that 
the Supreme Court has struck down aggregate election-cycle limits on 
federal campaign contributions in McCutcheon.24 In the immediate 
wake of the opinion, there was a lot of discussion suggesting that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McCutcheon is a salutary development 
that will help reverse the shadow party trend. 
We understand the argument. The emergence of shadow parties 
obviously owes something to campaign-finance deregulation—
especially the SpeechNow.org case which, following on from Citizens 
United,25 lifted restrictions on independent spending by PACs and 
thus gave us our current SuperPACs.26 As the always-thoughtful Bob 
Bauer has reminded us, these trends can be traced back all the way to 
the 1990s.27 Money and power move through the system through any 
outlet available, and McCutcheon has vastly expanded the capacity of 
the pipes that move money into the party. 
So will McCutcheon reroute the money back to the formal 
 
 24  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  
 25  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 26  Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 27  Bob Bauer, The Troubles of Political Parties and Misreadings of Citizens United, 
MORESOFTMONEYHARDLAW.COM (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2014/06/troubles-political-parties-misreadings-
citizens-united/.   
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parties? A fair number of commentators seem to think so.28 After all, 
many have complained that the formal parties have been at a 
fundraising disadvantage during the last few years: They were stuck 
raising limited funds, while SuperPACs and other shadow party 
entities could raise unlimited funds. As a result, even those who 
didn’t agree with McCutcheon saw a silver lining in the case. The idea 
is that by removing the aggregate contribution limits, McCutcheon 
will do much to restore the formal parties to parity with the shadow 
parties. Indeed, many predicted that we will see a lot of money that 
would have gone to outside groups flowing instead into the formal 
parties, campaigns, and leadership PACs. This view is fast becoming 
conventional wisdom in the field. 
There’s clearly something to this argument, but we have doubts 
about how far it really goes. We doubt that OFA or Crossroads are 
going to close up shop and tell their donors to give to the Democratic 
National Committee or the Republican National Committee instead. 
At the margins, McCutcheon may strengthen the formal parties at the 
expense of shadow parties, but we are skeptical about the magnitude 
of this effect. 
To understand our argument, it helps to move away from simple 
dichotomies, like the party elites versus ordinary members, or donors 
versus voters. We imagine there are several different strata of 












 28  See, e.g., David Brooks, Party All the Time, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/opinion/brooks-party-all-the-time.html; Richard L. 
Hasen, How “the Next Citizens United” Could Bring More Corruption—but Less 
Gridlock, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
how-the-next-citizens-united-could-bring-more-corruption—but-less-
gridlock/2014/02/21/a190d1c6-95ab-11e3-afce-3e7c922ef31e_story.html; Ray LaRaja, The 
McCutcheon Decision Could Be Good News After All, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/03/the-mccutcheon-
decision-could-be-good-news-after-all; Nathaniel Persily, Bringing Big Money out of the 
Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/bringing-big-money-out-of-the-shadows.html. 
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At the bottom of the pyramid, we have ordinary voters who 
support the party. Occupying the next level of the pyramid are the 
party faithful. These people are a lot like ordinary voters, except they 
invest their time and energies in campaigns. They volunteer, knock on 
doors, show up to caucuses. They do more than just vote, and as a 
result they have more influence. Small donors, we assume, are mostly 
drawn from these two groups. Needless to say, someone who gives 
only $20 or $50 to campaigns (or for that matter even $500) doesn’t 
have to worry about any campaign-finance regulation, now or in the 
foreseeable future. Any limit low enough to affect them would not be 
upheld.29 Indeed, campaign-finance regulation only benefits this 
group, at least to the extent that it means they’re not drowned out as 
much by folks higher in the pyramid.30 
So let’s turn to the large donors, the ones who might want to give 
somewhat more than $2600 (or $5200) to a candidate but can’t 
because those are the maximum individual contribution limits, which 
are still good law. We assume that there are quite a few donors in this 
group. But note that they weren’t bumping up against the aggregate 
 
 29  See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (striking down, inter alia, Vermont’s 
state contribution limit of $400 for statewide candidates in a two-year election cycle). 
 30  We know there’s no such thing as my speech drowning out your speech—but in 
Arizona Free Enterprise, the Court seemed to take a different view. See Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (striking down an Arizona state 
election regulation that provided matching funds for publicly financed opponents of self-
funding candidates when those self-funded campaigns or their independent supporters 
spent above the publicly funded candidates’ initial allotment).  
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limits. So they aren’t affected by McCutcheon. 
McCutcheon affects the next tier. These are the extra-large 
donors—the people, like Shaun McCutcheon, who want to give six-
figure amounts in a single cycle to candidates, party committees, 
leadership PACs, etc. It’s hard to know how many donors like 
McCutcheon exist. In 2012, only 646 donors hit the maximum.31 For 
them, McCutcheon matters. 
The real money in the election cycle, however, comes from the 
supersize donors who occupy the top tier—the multimillionaires and 
billionaires. If you’re George Soros or Sheldon Adelson, and you 
want to spend seven- or eight-figure sums in one election cycle, then 
McCutcheon will make little difference to you. In the 2012 cycle, for 
example, Adelson and his wife spent approximately $93 million.32 
Even with all the scenarios Justice Breyer spun out in his 
McCutcheon dissent, there simply aren’t enough candidates and state 
parties in the whole country to absorb $93 million at $5200 a pop.33 If 
you want to spend that kind of money, you’re going to do it through 
the shadow parties. 
Even if you didn’t have to use the shadow parties, why wouldn’t 
you? If you create your own shadow party entity, your contributions 
go to a group that unambiguously answers to you. You’re the one 
with ultimate authority over both personnel and major strategic 
decisions. And you probably have a good deal of confidence 
(warranted or not) in your ability to steer organizations. And 
supersize donors face no real costs, in terms of power and influence, 
from using shadow party vehicles rather than the formal party: when 
the funding is on this scale, every candidate and elected official pays 
attention. 
If you’re a Shaun McCutcheon, in contrast, you can’t set up your 
own shadow party group. With your budget, it would have just a 
handful of employees, and none of them would be Karl Rove or Jim 
Messina. You can’t afford them. But for the top tier of donors who 
can afford to hire those guys, there’s little reason to work within the 
formal party, where decisions will get made by people who have to 
 
 31  Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why.  
 32  Julie Bykowicz, Adelson Wooed by Republican Presidential Prospects at Vegas Meet, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-
29/republican-presidential-hopefuls-in-vegas-to-woo-donor-adelson.html.  
 33  See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1472 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(describing three “methods for using today’s opinion to evade the law’s individual 
contribution limits”). 
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answer to constituencies other than you. When Adelson recently had 
the 2016 Republican candidates out to Las Vegas to kiss his ring, he 
had no reason to involve the RNC.34 Even if every Adelson were to 
give, say, a few million dollars to one party or another just as a 
“gimme,” the odds are that they will still be putting a great deal more 
into the shadow parties. 
Those who are betting on McCutcheon to strengthen the formal 
parties are betting on one of two things. Either they think more 
Shaun McCutcheons exist than we do, or they think that—contrary to 
arguments we outlined above—the Adelsons and Kochs will allocate 
a large percentage of their spending to the parties. It’s hard to know 
who is right, of course, especially as it always takes a while for 
campaign-spending patterns to catch up with the law. But the early 
results aren’t particularly compelling for those who thought 
McCutcheon was going to matter. The GOP has formed only a 
handful of joint fundraising committees, and the amounts involved 
aren’t that far above the old aggregate limits.35 The Democrats 
haven’t even bothered to form such organizations.36 We expect this to 
change (the parties rarely leave a fundraising opportunity 
unexploited). But we think that the parties’ lackadaisical attitudes 
may reflect an underlying reality: There aren’t as many McCutcheons 
out there as some commentators thought. That means the shadow 
parties will continue to grow in importance over the next election 
cycles. 
III 
WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
If our empirical predictions are correct—if the shadow parties 
continue to grow in influence and McCutcheon doesn’t level the 
playing field—why should we care? Set aside the worries about dark 
 
 34  See Matea Gold & Philip Rucker, Billionaire Mogul Sheldon Adelson Looks for 
Mainstream Republican Who Can Win in 2016, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/billionaire-mogul-sheldon-adelson-looks-for-
mainstream-republican-who-can-win-in-2016/2014/03/25/e2f47bb0-b3c2-11e3-8cb6-
284052554d74_story.html (describing private meetings between Adelson and potential 
2016 Republican presidential candidates).  
 35  Robert K. Kelner, Commentary, The Practical Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 
HARV. L. REV. F. 380, 383 (2014), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/vol127_Kelner.pdf. 
 36  See Byron Tau, GOP Launches New Big Money Effort, POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2014, 
5:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/republicans-targeted-state-victory-
fundraising-109724.html (describing the Targeted States Victory Committee, a 2014 
Republican official-party joint fundraising effort that solicits checks of up to $162,400 to 
be distributed to the national party and thirteen battleground state parties). 
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money’s hidden influence. Imagine that the shadow parties were 
required to disclose donors but otherwise retained their fundraising 
advantage. We would still worry about which direction the money 
flowed. That’s because power and money run together in our political 
system. It would be a mistake to view the dynamics of party 
regulation purely in terms of money finding its level. The people at 
the different strata of the pyramid we described may all be on the 
same team, but that doesn’t mean they all agree. Sometimes they 
disagree strenuously. The question of who’s going to win those 
disputes—who’s going to steer this unwieldy and complex entity that 
we call the party writ large—depends on which forms of influence 
have more weight. And that, in turn, depends on where the center of 
gravity lies within the party writ large. 
This isn’t just an empirical question, but a normative one. We’ve 
been struck by how little political theory has to say about who ought 
to steer the party—or, for that matter, who ought to influence 
candidates. On one side, there’s an equality view, which effectively 
boils down to a rough rule of one party member, one vote. On this 
view, it’s only the voters—the party in the electorate—who ought to 
be in the driver’s seat. Any time donors are influencing the direction 
of the party, that’s a form of corruption. 
What’s striking about McCutcheon is how firmly it rejects this 
view while (implicitly) endorsing another. The first sentence of the 
decision says that “[t]here is no right more basic in our democracy 
than the right to participate in electing our political leaders.”37 As 
retired Justice Stevens pointed out, this sentence is totally off topic, 
unless you want to equate donating with more traditional forms of 
political participation, like voting or volunteering.38 Later on the 
decision repeatedly refers to donors as “constituents,” and says that 
responsiveness to these donor-constituents is “a central feature of 
democracy” that “is key to the very concept of self-governance 
through elected officials.”39 
While McCutcheon’s account is problematic, so is the pure 
equality view. It’s not only naïve, but foolishly simplistic given that 
most voters are not politically engaged. It’s a traditional point in the 
 
 37  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440–41 (emphasis added).   
 38  Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong 
Direction,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-
in-wrong-direction.html?_r=0 (“‘The first sentence here,’ [Justice Stevens] said, ‘is not 
really about what the case is about’” and that it’s wrong to suggest that “‘the voter is less 
important than the man who provides money to the candidate.’”). 
 39  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1462.  
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literature that party elites wield more power over elections than the 
electorate, and most people in the field think it’s a good thing, too. 
Party elites do know a great deal more about steering the party than 
the electorate. Most experts would agree that they ought to exercise 
more influence than the equality view, taken to its logical limit, would 
allow. 
We’re most interested in a group that has largely been neglected 
in this debate—the group that stands between the electorate and the 
elites, between the people and the party. We’re interested in the party 
faithful. If everything’s up to the electorate or the elites, there’s no 
room for the party faithful to exert any special influence. Indeed, our 
fear is that the power shift from the formal parties to the shadow 
parties is most likely to undermine the influence the party faithful 
wield.40 
That would be unfortunate, in our view. The party faithful are 
the backbone of the party. They generate much of its energy. They 
carry out its ground game. And they can check the party elites on 
behalf of the electorate. As one of us has noted elsewhere, the party 
faithful help solve a conundrum in politics.41 Given that voters can’t 
monitor their representatives, how does the principal control the 
agent? We often cast the political parties in this role because they 
enforce party discipline and punish defectors. To invoke the Latin 
phrase, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Who will guard the guardians?42 
One possible answer is the party faithful. They are everyday voters 
who have chosen to invest their energies in the parties and, as a 
result, have one foot in each world. They can speak for everyday 
voters because they are everyday voters. But they are more likely to 
be heard because they speak from inside the campaign, not outside of 
it. Presence matters. As one of us has observed elsewhere, the 
influence of the party faithful comes in part from “being under one 
roof, interacting regularly with the campaign leadership. We are 
social animals. Our views are shaped by those around us whether we 
are aware of it or not.”43 
 
 40  We don’t want to exaggerate this claim, however, because we take seriously the 
point Kate Andrias makes in this symposium—that the party faithful’s decline was 
occurring even before the rise of the shadow parties. Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out 
Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 48–50 (2014). Nonetheless, we worry that the 
shadow parties are far more closed off to the party faithful than formal party structure, for 
all of its shortcomings, has ever been. 
 41  Gerken, supra note 1, at 921.  
 42  For an overview of the literature and an astute take on the question, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 
(1999). 
 43  Gerken, supra note 1, at 922.  
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The shift from the formal parties to the shadow parties is likely 
to undermine the party faithful’s influence. One way to think about 
this problem is to return to one of our early observations—that the 
party is a complex ecosystem. The formal parties in particular are 
highly complex entities, with national, state, and local layers that 
mirror our federalist system and a variety of methods of selecting 
leaders at each level. When mobilized for campaigns, the formal 
parties have enormous needs of many different kinds, each of which 
becomes a point of entry: you can be part of the party, and influence 
it more than an ordinary voter, by going door to door, by aggregating 
donations, by spending every spare hour working on a campaign. 
These multiple points of entry are useful from a pluralist point of 
view. They accommodate different types of people. They make the 
party more open than it would otherwise be, more capable of change 
in response to various different combinations of time, effort, 
enthusiasm, and (for good or ill) ability to pay. The formal parties, in 
this way, are reasonably pluralistic in terms of avenues of influence. 
The party faithful have a variety of routes for influencing the 
leadership, and that’s all to the good. 
The shadow parties are different. They are structured so that 
they ultimately answer to their funders alone. As a result, they 
provide a more efficient mechanism for those funders to exercise 
influence than would be possible if everything had to flow through 
formal party organizations. But the shadow parties are, by and large, 
completely closed to the party faithful. The people that control the 
shadow parties are either the donors who fund them or the elites who 
run them. The party faithful remain hived off in the formal party 
structure—which, with each election cycle, is becoming less important 
to the direction taken by the party writ large. 
Returning to the other observation with which we began, the 
question of party control is particularly fraught at this moment. Even 
as the center of gravity within the party writ large is shifting, the 
parties as brands could hardly be stronger. In a world of weak formal 
parties and strong shadow parties, these powerful brands are the 
intellectual property of no one. With primary elections for nearly 
every important partisan office, the Democratic or Republican mantle 
is available to anyone who can convince a partisan group of voters 
that they are entitled to take it up. That system is very small-d 
democratic . . . as long as you’ve got the money. Because all that 
convincing turns out to be a very expensive process—one in which the 
shadow parties are playing an increasingly central role. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, we worry about how campaign finance 
regulation (and deregulation) risks flattening a complex and 
pluralistic system in a way that cuts out the party faithful, leaving only 
the big donors and the mass voting public—the top and bottom of the 
pyramid—with nobody in between. That kind of politics may be well-
adapted to (or even an outgrowth of) a world dominated by broadcast 
media. But we think it’s a hollowed-out kind of politics, missing some 
of the energy and engagement and forms of influence that should 
matter to all of us. 
 
